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Introducing Diagnosis-Related Groups in Kazakhstan: evolution, 
achievements, and challenges 
 
Abstract 
In 2012, Kazakhstan introduced Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs), as part of a package of reforms 
which sought to contain costs and to improve efficiency and transparency in the health system; but 
the main challenge was to design and implement a DRG system in just one year. 
In 2011-2012, Kazakhstan developed its own DRG system. Initially 180 DRGs were defined to group 
inpatient cases but this number was subsequently expanded to more than 400. Because of time 
limits, the cost weights had to be derived in the absence of existing standard hospital cost 
accounting systems, and a national patient data transfer system also needed developing. Most 
importantly, huge efforts were needed to develop a regulatory framework and build up DRG 
capabilities at a national level. 
The implementation of DRGs was facilitated by strong political will for their introduction as part of a 
coherent package of health reforms, and consolidated efforts to build capacity. DRGs are now the 
key payment mechanism for hospitals. However the reforms are not fully institutionalized: the DRG 
structure is continuously being refined in a context of data limitations, and the revision of cost 
weights is most affected by insufficient data and the lack of standardized reporting mechanisms. 
Capacity around DRG coding is also still being developed.  
Countries planning to introduce DRG systems should be aware of the challenges in moving too 
quickly to implement DRGs as the main hospital reimbursement mechanism.   
 
Keywords 
DRG payment; payment reforms; Kazakhstan; health care reform; hospital; inpatient care 
 
Introduction 
Kazakhstan is an upper-middle income country in Central Asia which spent 4.3% of GDP on health in 
2013, 53% of which was from public sources 1. When Kazakhstan gained independence from the 
Soviet Union in 1991 it inherited an overcapacity in inpatient care with 1091 acute care hospital beds 
per 100000 population in 1990. Under the Soviet system there was a strong incentive for the 
continuous expansion of staff and bed numbers as financing mechanisms were input-based. Since 
independence, hospital capacity has more than halved (444 acute care hospital beds per 100,000 
population in 2013), but it remains well above the EU average (356 per 100,000 in 2013) 1. The 
average length of stay is very long (9.4 days in acute care hospitals in 2013) compared with the EU 
average (6.3 in 2013) which potentially explains why the bed occupancy rate is so high (86.8% in 
2013, 76.6% in the EU in 2012) despite the relatively low throughput of patients (14.7 acute hospital 
discharges per 100 in 2013, 16.2 in the EU) 1.  
Reforms since independence have sought to move to output-based financing mechanisms, but cost 
containment and ensuring adequate financing for the hospital sector have proved difficult. The 
current restructuring process is wide-ranging as it encompasses wholesale reform of health financing 
mechanisms and provider payment mechanisms to improve efficiency and equity, alongside reforms 
to the health care delivery system to strengthen primary and inpatient care 2. In the hospital sector 
two aspects of the reform programme which have had the greatest impact are the introduction of 
DRGs for purchasing services and the autonomization of providers. Most hospitals remain state-
owned, but over the past 20 years they have been granted greater managerial autonomy, having 
previously been the responsibility of their respective level of government. After the radical 
decentralization of purchasing to the local level in 1999, there has been a gradual consolidation and 
defragmentation of resource pooling with regional health departments purchasing all services from 
2005 to 2009. Since 2010, the purchasing of hospital services has been centralized in a single agency 
under the Ministry of Health (the Medical Service Purchasing Committee) 2.  
The introduction of a national DRG system for the reimbursement of hospitals in Kazakhstan in 2012 
is an interesting example of DRG implementation, because despite facing many challenges, the new 
system was planned and implemented in less than a year rather than a more gradual approach over 
a transition period, and employed a Kazakh DRG classification and cost-weight system, rather than 
adapting an existing international DRG system.  
The government of Kazakhstan decided to adopt DRGs as a key instrument for improving financial 
transparency.  Grouping large numbers of similar patients enables managerial analysis and improved 
efficiency by incentivising hospitals through financial mechanisms to improve performance 3, 4. In 
addition, a DRG system was regarded as an important vehicle for transforming inpatient care 
towards a more market-driven system and as a more equitable mechanism for public resource 
allocation across the country to address geographical disparities. This paper adds to the growing 
literature in the field examining the practicalities of implementing DRGs and how the challenges can 
be approached or mitigated 5, 6.  
 
Background 
 
Kazakhstan first implemented a form of DRGs under a decentralized regional financing model in 
2005 but then abandoned it in 2009 for an alternative nationally financed case-based system. In 
common with similar reforms in some other post-Soviet countries, this case-based funding system 
resulted in a major upward pressure on the budget 7.   The initial DRG system in place before this 
failed to elicit the expected improvements in hospital performance because there was a conflict 
between the incentives created by this system and the planning system which was still based on 
input norms as the main determinant of funding allocations. Due to rigid financing rules and 
procedures, purchasers were not able to purchase selectively according to performance results and 
hospital managers were not able to reallocate and use resources in more cost efficient ways 2. 
The case-based funding reform in 2009 involved the development of Medical Economic Tariffs 
(METs) which used normative clinical protocols, resource unit prices and standardized volumes for 
cases to reimburse hospitals. The MET system placed an excessive burden on the health budget, due 
to significant transaction costs caused by overwhelming volumes of hospital claims, together with 
the unintended over-treatment of patients and up-coding to higher MET rates, which are common 
features in the initial development of case-based payment systems 8, 9. The health budget was spent 
after 9-10 months and the Ministry of Health was obliged to approach the Ministry of Finance for 
additional funding.  
With the new DRG system, immediate exclusive coverage of the same services and scope as the 
METs was deemed politically necessary as any restriction would be perceived as a step backwards. 
However, the existing patient classification system based on the METs was not compatible with DRG 
systems used internationally, so Kazakhstan decided to develop its own DRG groups. It was felt that 
adapting and adjusting an existing system would take longer than self-developing one and that the 
MET system was generating sufficient data to enable them to do it, and this is not unusual in the 
Central-East European context 10.   
The urgent need to replace the MET system resulted in an extremely ambitious timescale for DRG 
implementation; the policy decision to move to a national DRG system covering most inpatient 
hospital services was made in 2011 and the national DRG system has been in place since January 
2012. Countries tend to move gradually from a DRG patient classification system to a full hospital 
reimbursement system over a multi-year transition period 11; but circumstances in Kazakhstan 
meant that DRGs had to be implemented in less than a year with the capacity development and 
stakeholder engagement elements running in parallel.  
 Content of reform 
The reintroduction of DRGs was outlined in the strategy document “The State Health Care 
Development Program for 2011–2015 “Salamatty Kazakhstan” which sought to develop a health 
system capable of providing health care for all citizens and to address key health challenges in a 
manner that instils a sense of shared responsibility for health between the state, employers and 
individuals, and achieve greater efficiency in service purchasing 12. Under “Salamatty Kazakhstan” 
the government significantly increased resources allocated to health from the national budget. 
Hospitals were also granted greater autonomy while purchasing was recentralized from the regional 
to the national level. Contracting is now conducted by the Medical Service Purchasing Committee (a 
central government agency) at the national level. These changes which supported the introduction 
of DRGs required significant capacity development in new governance and accountability structures 
13. The creation of DRGs in Kazakhstan as the key payment mechanism for inpatient services under 
the guaranteed package of benefits, entailed the development of DRG grouping algorithm and 
respective costs weights, the introduction of relevant regulations to govern hospital service 
purchasing through DRGs, the establishment of a national DRG unit, and some capacity building 
initiatives for DRG coding. The aim was to improve transparency in health system financing, to 
improve the technical efficiency of the health system, and to contain costs through the introduction 
of DRGs.   
DRGs are a patient classification system that groups patients into clinically meaningful and 
economically homogeneous groups to (i) identify which services are provided in which hospitals 
(that is, through patient classification, measuring hospital output, etc); and (ii) provide incentives for 
the efficient use of resources within hospitals 11. The DRG case-mix classification system has been 
widely applied around the world 14. Internationally, when introducing a  DRG system, it is most 
common to use or adapt existing patient classification systems to derive between 600 and 1200 DRG 
groups 15. In contrast, Kazakhstan developed its own DRG system, initially to determine 180 DRG 
groups covering most services. From 2013, the DRG logic has extended to 430 DRG groups. 
The DRG groups were classified using the main diagnosis for medical illnesses from ICD9 and the 
main procedures for ICD10 surgical groups. Subsequent work centred on adding groups for high cost 
interventions and feasibility work into the development of a “Kazakh Grouper” algorithm. Initial DRG 
cost weights were derived from disaggregating historical expenditure data and adapting MET 
normative prices as there was no existing hospital standard cost accounting system in Kazakhstan. 
Later development work has focussed on absorption costing methodology in sample hospitals as the 
underpinning for revising cost weights. The development of hospital standard costings was also 
found to be a problem when introducing DRGs in other post-Socialist settings16-19.  
A national web portal for a patient data transfer system was developed with regular and timely 
uploading of standardized patient information to the central data agency. Legal decrees governed 
the hospital billing and reporting process for the initial development of DRGs included basic invoicing 
rules, data quality and quality control which are closely monitored on an on-going basis by three 
state institutions. This allowed guidelines for billing, clinical coding and standardized costing to be 
developed. Clinical coding is basic and later development work has focussed on improving clinical 
coding as an essential underpinning for improvements in DRG grouping. 
Kazakhstan has few exclusions from the DRG coverage, but these include: capital charges, out-
patient care, rehabilitation and children’s long term care, rural hospitals, TB and oncology services, 
teaching and research and some high technology services e.g. transplantation surgery. Currently 
equity of funding continues to be under threat because highly specialized service providers are 
skewing reimbursement towards their high-cost low-volume services, and transparency is hampered 
by resistance to sharing cost data and changing reporting requirements. Work to refine incentives in 
the system is therefore ongoing. The Ministry of Health and Social Development (as the Ministry of 
Health became in 2014) has decided to select pilot hospitals to standardize cost data and establish 
costs centres to support DRG improvement by generating evidence for revising cost-weights. 
 
Stakeholder positions 
The key stakeholder in the introduction of the new DRG system was the Ministry of Health which 
initiated the DRG reform in July 2012, provided oversight for it and developed the regulatory 
framework. Under the Ministry, the Medical Service Purchasing Committee (as the single purchaser 
in the system) was the main implementer of the DRG reforms. There is also a National DRG Office 
which is responsible for data collection and refining the DRGs in place. The National DRG Office is a 
division of the Republican Centre of Health Development, which is subordinated to the Ministry of 
Health and Social Development. By providing loans the World Bank supported technical assistance 
for the development and implementation of DRGs, but the key stakeholder remained the Ministry of 
Health and Social Development.  
Figure 1 Position of stakeholders and influence at a glance 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 Source: adapted from Geissler and Quentin (2010)20 
There was considerable resistance to change in some regions and reluctance by some hospital 
managers to share cost information or to buy into the new administrative procedures involved, 
despite international evidence that increasing information through DRG development helps hospital 
managers run their own hospitals more effectively 21. Providers were resistant to the introduction of 
DRGs as they were generally quite comfortable with the METs, because this system obliged the 
Ministry to pay for every case submitted. However, there is some evidence of “early adopter” 
hospitals and regions successfully using the DRG system which may become role models for others. 
There is certainly strong government support and leadership by Ministry of Health and Social 
Development through the “service purchasing” and “service quality” departments and 
organizational development for hospital managers has been planned.  
 
Achievements and challenges 
The development and implementation of a DRG system in Kazakhstan in under one year was a 
significant undertaking. The DRG system now represents the main funding channel for hospitals in 
Kazakhstan and it is more manageable in contract terms than the previous MET system thereby 
overcoming many of its limitations. However, challenges remain and significant refinement is 
required to maximize its potential for improving equity in financing, increasing transparency in the 
system, and improving the efficiency of inpatient care. International evidence indicates that it will 
take time for these outcomes to be realized and become fully measurable. It needs to be 
accompanied by wider service purchasing and service delivery reforms, and further steps are also 
needed to make sure these reforms are institutionalized.   
Table 1: Summary of achievements and challenges in the introduction of DRGs in Kazakhstan 
Achievements Challenges 
 Strong political will for implementation 
as part of a coherent package of reforms 
 
 Development of new DRG system in the 
absence of standard cost accounting 
system in hospitals 
 
  Development of a patient data transfer 
system 
 
 Technical and managerial capacity 
building at the national level to support 
implementation of DRGs 
 
 Resistance to data sharing at the 
institutional level 
 
 Basic clinical coding with gaps in the 
coding of secondary diagnoses, co-
morbidities, complications and 
procedures 
 
 Highly specialized hospitals skewing 
reimbursement system in their favour 
 
 Current service price based system not 
sufficiently accurate estimate of service 
costs 
 Implemented as key payment 
mechanism for inpatient services 
nationwide 
 
 Use of DRGs for purchasing only a 
certain proportion of inpatient services 
reduced impact on efficiency 
 
Initial assessment of the new DRG system shows that among the most critical next steps will be to 
develop a standardized cost accounting system to measure resource consumption of clinical 
activities, and to refine a Kazakh DRG Grouper by adjusting the clinical logic of the case classification 
system.  Currently, the Kazakhstan DRG system of 400+ groups needs to be further improved to 
meet international standards for reliability of clinical and cost homogeneity.  In 2013, it scored 39.2% 
against a minimum standard of 60% using a standard R2 test to check the reliability of the DRG 
system in capturing clinical and cost homogeneity. International evidence indicates that usually 500+ 
groups are needed, although most use more 15.  
Finally, significant efforts are needed to develop the technical capacity to manage the DRG system – 
especially at the hospital level – so that administrators have the skills to reliably collect appropriate 
technical data and management understand how to analyse and use these data to enhance the 
performance of their autonomous hospitals.  Coding requires development, as there is currently 
insufficient coding of secondary diagnoses, co-morbidities complications and procedures. Clear and 
standardized coding of all these variables is an essential requirement for an effectively functioning 
DRG system 15.  There is also no standard costing system in Kazakhstan and the current service price 
based systems are unlikely to represent a good estimate of service “costs” 22. DRGs require a 
functioning hospital cost accounting system, usually based on a cost centre allocation methodology 
23. But capacity building is also needed at the central level. Consequently, within the Ministry of 
Health and Social Development, a DRG Bureau has been established which is developing the 
technical competencies and capacities of staff. Further plans are being developed to increase 
technical capacity in costing and coding at the hospital level.  
 
Conclusion 
Over the last 3 years, the Kazakhstan health system has made progress in resolving the challenges it 
has faced and while DRG development has not been optimal, it did address the immediate 
budgetary concerns caused by the previous MET system. The Ministry of Health and Social 
Development has built a foundation on which the Kazakh DRG system can be developed on an on-
going basis while remaining a functional and useful instrument. DRGs are now used for purchasing a 
large proportion of hospital services covered under the State Guaranteed Health Benefit Package.  
The main enabling factors that allowed the DRG system to be implemented in such a short period of 
time included strong political will for their implementation as part of a coherent package of health 
reforms and the large-scale investment in information technology nationally to allow data 
generation. But the increased budget for hospital services and recentralization of purchasing 
functions were also important. As changing hospital reimbursement systems radically and quickly 
can undermine the credibility of a DRG system, it was important to ensure the system’s acceptability 
by underwriting the stability of the hospital incomes during the initial change period. 
Overall, the Kazakhstan experience demonstrates the need to be prepared to invest heavily from the 
outset and accept that implementation of DRGs will take time and prove challenging. As such, when 
considering adopting DRGs, countries need to go in “with their eyes open”. Ideally, the introduction 
of DRGs should be part of a wider strategy for health system strengthening, and there should be a 
preparatory period for the development of a regulatory framework and underpinning systems. 
Significant investment in technical and managerial capacity development on a national level are also 
necessary, to be followed by piloting and refinement prior to the system being scaled up.   
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